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The Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum was created in 2009. Study groups at the first congress (in Brussels on November 16-17, 2009), and the second congress (in Berlin on 18-19 November, 2010) suggested involving ‘frozen conflict’ zones¹ in specific EU programs. In particular, this concerns Artsakh (a.k.a. the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh), Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria.

The above-mentioned countries in different European programs have been discussed in many analytical circles and public organizations. They will soon become more systematic, having been reflected in various resolutions on issues related to the Southern Caucasus Region and the Eastern Partnership initiative, which were approved by the European Parliament. The most recent resolution, “On reviewing the European Partnership Program – the Eastern Dimension”,  was approved on April 7, 2011. Item no. 48 calls upon EU executive authorities, adhering to the European non-recognition policy, to implement programs aimed at creating an atmosphere of confidence, and to adopt new missions and strategies of public cooperation, which would include “pragmatic initiatives and innovative approaches through unofficial contacts and meetings with communities from these ‘secessionist’ territories”.²

By launching this process, often called ‘Involvement without Recognition’, the EU aims at cooperating actively with non-recognized or partially recognized countries on post-Soviet territory through their respective civil societies. How should the EU’s position be interpreted? We feel that there are several reasons for this stance:

1. The EU wishes to make sure that the above-mentioned countries are predictable, and to prevent them from becoming self-isolated;

2. The EU wishes to involve the above-mentioned countries in certain programs so that there are no ‘non-European oases’ in areas associated with the Eastern Partnership;

3. The EU wishes to take part in resolving conflicts in Eastern Partnership areas. This is brought up in item no. 49 of the Resolution of April 7, 2011, whereby the EU is invited to take part in settling current regional conflicts by means of a special EU representative institution, supervised by the High Representative for EU Foreign and Security Policy, the Deputy Representative of the European Commission.³

4. The position of the EU has evolved because of the activities of different lobby groups (particularly Armenian organizations).

We would like to point out that European countries have been making great efforts in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic ever since 1992, when the war initiated by Azerbaijan was just beginning, and when more than 40% of Nagorno-Karabakh was consequently seized by Azerbaijan. These efforts were basically humanitarian, and were also undertaken by Christian organizations and human rights associations. The truce of 1994 concluded between Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Armenia allowed the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh to recover from the consequences of a difficult war, build up government structures, and create a civil society. European countries and organizations have shown a growing interest in the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh since 2000. This was first observed in the peace initiatives, which were aimed at promoting a peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Work programs have become more coordinated since 2003, when initiatives introduced by the British organizations Alert, Conciliation Resources and the London Information Network on Conflicts and State Building (LINKS) led to the creation of a consortium dedicated to directing the efforts of European civil society towards resolving the Karabakh conflict. Today this Consortium includes such organizations as International Alert, Conciliation Resources, the Conflict Management Initiative, Kvinna till Kvinna, and the London Information Network on Conflicts and State Building (LINKS), which are all financed by the EU in order to support efforts to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict.

The Consortium’s main objectives  consist in seeking initiatives to promote a peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict in cooperation with local civilians and political activists. In this context, the Consortium emphasizes the importance of media-based initiatives, and better opportunities for the mass media to ensure an environment of alternative and balanced information in order to support the settlement of this conflict, as well as the peacekeeping missions. The Consortium also aims at giving more opportunities to the parties involved in the conflict by encouraging more critical viewpoints in socially active groups participating in the peace process. The Consortium also wishes to create an effective and integrated environment to settle the issues through closer negotiations.

The main partners of the Consortium in Nagorno-Karabakh are the Stepanakert Press Club, which since January 2009 has been publishing Analitikon, a monthly analytical and advertising magazine, Demo, a public newspaper published from 2004 to 2008; the Institute of National Democracy, which basically gets involved with peacekeeping activities by participating in meetings with young people and other groups in Karabakh, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; the analytical center of the unregistered Council on Foreign and Security Policies of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, which has operated since 2008, and is involved in programs requiring expert and analytical work ; it is managed by the former Deputy Foreign Minister of Nagorno-Karabakh, Masis Mailyan, who was the main alternative candidate during the last presidential elections in 2007. These organizations are considered to be the main partners of the Consortium in Nagorno-Karabakh, regardless of the fact that other organizations in one form or another also take part in different programs.

Judging by the fact that the positions of the different communities have become much more rigid, militaristic rhetoric has increased, particularly  against the background of repeated aggressive demands coming from Azerbaijan - not only from official channels, but also from civilians, - and against the background of the accelerating arms race, it can be supposed that the work of the Consortium has not been very effective. In our opinion, inaccurate and unsound tactics are the main reasons for this situation. The peacekeeping programs in their present format are very inefficient. In particular, our contacts with young people taking part in different programs involving Karabakh and Azerbaijan confirm that most of them are participating in these programs just to visit Tbilisi or Jordan, and have a good time there. There is no doubt that direct contacts between Karabakh and Azerbaijani young people allow both sides to receive alternative information. However, such contacts are not really effective, and, in the end, the even more closely-knit circles of young people do not contribute to encouraging more trust, or improving the measures which were initially aimed towards peacekeeping.  On the other hand, it should be noted that the European organizations which have joined the Consortium have spent impressive amounts of money (allocated by the EU) on their own administrative expenses, hotel accommodation, trips, and other items, which make EU efforts to improve the situation even more inefficient. Despite these observations, we should assess the media initiatives to have been successful to a certain extent, considering that they have helped to form an alternative press in these communities.

Having expanded its activities in the region after the start of the Eastern Partnership, it is important for the EU to take the experiences of the Consortium into account, particularly its mistakes. The EU should not waste time introducing fruitless peacekeeping initiatives, but should pay more attention to directly implementing different educational programs, and developing a civil society and a free press, but without associating them with certain aspects of the actual conflict. Democratic countries, where the driving force is civil society, are more open to dialogue and reconciliation than post-totalitarian, nationalistic, and narrow-minded communities. Work programs with  civil society in Karabakh should be run outside this conflictual context, as public organizations have already been seriously criticized for ‘funded peacekeeping activities’ by Azerbaijan’s leaders of militarist rhetoric.

In this context, it is very important for the EU to work directly with public organizations in Nagorno-Karabakh, in compliance with the Resolution approved by the European Parliament on April 7, 2011. European efforts in this region, and especially in Nagorno-Karabakh, will then become much more effective. It is also important for the EU to find the courage to stand up and cooperate with the authorities of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. There is no doubt that readiness to work with Karabakh civil society will be more than welcome, but we should not forget that it is this society that elects its own government through a democratic process. This policy of involvement, activated by the Eastern Partnership, could considerably enhance the role of the EU in the region, and bring about positive results in the Southern Caucasus, where they are greatly needed.

In conclusion, we wish to confirm that the launch of the Eastern Partnership, and the principle of ‘Involvement without Recognition’ have become real and significant opportunities to develop a civil society in the conflict zones neighbouring Europe; in fact, these efforts are absolutely necessary for achieving success and making positive strides in the unrecognized or partially recognized post-Soviet republics. Whether these opportunities will be properly used will to a great extent depend on how real and informal these efforts are, and to what extent previous mistakes are avoided.

1.  Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, recommendations, working group 1: Democracy, human rights, good governance and stability, http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/civil_society/forum/working_group1_en.pdf) .
2. European Parliament Resolution of 7 April 2011 on the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy - Eastern Dimension, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-0153+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
3. See same Resolution, Article 49.