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The analysis

Based on the argument that international actors and organisations tend to spread their own type of system in order to be able to cooperate with actors with similar value patterns, it is generally assumed that the EU’s foreign policy follows internal value patterns and transfers these to its external dimension. This paper critically analyses to what extent the EU’s normative agenda is pursued and implemented in the case of Azerbaijan. Special emphasis is given to views and attitudes of EU officials involved in the implementation of the ENP in Azerbaijan.

An additional and related aspect concerns potential reform partners of the EU, who are able to advocate democratic reforms. In countries where domestic structures decrease the likeliness of reforms (e.g. political elites as veto-players, weak political opposition), supporters of policy change have to be found outside of power structures, notably in civil society. Several scholars argue that external actors are more successful in triggering democratic change if they cooperate with reform-minded domestic actors that agree with their political objectives and interests. This paper analyses whether the EU sees the potential of civil society as a reform partner and whether it can count on its support.[1]

Focusing on both the implementation of the EU’s normative agenda and possible reform partners, the paper finds answers to the following research questions: Does the implementation of the ENP in Azerbaijan match its formulation? And how do ENP goals and their implementation resonate in Azerbaijan, notably in civil society? The paper argues that in Azerbaijan the EU pursues the ENP goals only partially and implements them inconsistently. The lack of a comprehensive civil society inclusion is a case in point.

Main findings

The analysis of the EU’s policy towards Azerbaijan and the role of civil society shows how differently EU officials and local civil society receive, interpret and promote official EU policy goals.

First, the paper demonstrates that the EU discursively constructs civil society as a reform partner that can contribute to the achievement of goals set by the ENP in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood. This ambitious idea is, however, not specified or differentiated by geographic or thematic implementation instruments.

Second, the analysis of views and attitudes of EU officials working in Azerbaijan suggests that the ambitious discourse has only limited relevance for the implementation of the ENP. EU actors’ knowledge about the political context and the weakness of civil society does not result in an innovative adaption of general goals to functional and tailor-made policies. Instead, policy goals and concepts as expressed in the formulation phase are downgraded to unrealisable visions or secondary objectives. The fact that the EU largely neglects the potential of civil society to be, or to become, a reform partner seems to be related to the EU’s energy priorities and its desire to keep good and close relations with the Azerbaijani government.

Third, the paper shows that civil society actors in Azerbaijan perceive the EU mainly as a donor with an administrative-technical function rather than a political actor and influential promoter of democracy that helps to empower civil society. Generally, the instrumentalisation of civil society (‘agent of EU foreign policy’) is not criticisedby civil society actors in Azerbaijan but – based on a general agreement with ENP goals – largely welcomed. The implementation of this idea is, however, seen in a more ambivalent light. Demands for a reorientation of EU assistance towards an approach focusing on capacity-development of civil society are coupled with calls for a more systematic involvement of civil society in political processes, e.g. in the framework of the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Given the weakness and fragmentation of the civil society sector, the ability of civil society to become the EU’s implementing partner without increased and adapted support from the EU seems limited.

Recommendations

What implications do these conclusions have for the EU’s policy towards Azerbaijan? The following recommendations are based on the priorities and perceptions of governmental and societal actors in Azerbaijan and call on the EU to act without waiting for a change in the current political situation.

·         Building capacities in civil society:The EU does not consider the Azerbaijani civil society as its reform partner in the area of democracy and human rights and thus fails to build on its potential. Given civil society’s increasing criticism towards the EU’s priorities and performance in its relations towards Azerbaijan, the EU should start rethinking its approach towards civil society. It should set up small-scale grant programmes which would better match the capacities of local civil society and focus more strongly on capacity-development measures. Moreover, in the context of increasing and violent pressure on human rights NGOs and political activists in spring of 2011, the EU should do more to systematically include civil society-related issues in the political dialogue with the government. A statement issued by the EU Delegation in March 2011 expressing concern about recent arrests of youth activists, underlining the EU’s support for democracy and human rights in Azerbaijan and calling on the government to ensure dialogue and cooperation with the civil society and international actors is a positive step in this direction.

·         Fostering competition among ENP partners: According to the observations of EU representatives and civil society actors, the political leadership in Azerbaijan compares its performance regarding EU integration with that of its neighbours and competitors and demands equal treatment, even in the areas of democracy and human rights. The EU should use this tendency to its advantage and seek to exercise leverage by fostering competition among the ENP partner countries and thus increasing the pressure for reforms. This could be done by a more systematic and open formulation of regional differences in the field of democracy and human rights towards the respective governments or by including additional elements – beyond the Governance Facility – which make assistance conditional upon progress made on the agreed reform agenda. This would reward ‘leaders’ and leave ‘laggards’ empty-handed, as the new ‘more for more’ strategy of the European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union suggests.

·         Bypassing the ‘independence’ argument: Azerbaijan’s independence due to its large energy reserves is generally seen as obviating democratisation and compliance with reform suggestions, which are (too cautiously) proposed by the EU. Several factors, however, relativise the country’s independence and give the EU possible leverage to promote stability based on values. First, Azerbaijan is as interested in selling its resources as EU member states are in buying them. Moreover, given that trade in energy is long-term and pipelines cannot be changed at whim, dependence on energy ‘partners’ increases once they have been chosen. Second, stability and jurisdictional reliability, i.e. the rule of law, including more transparent and democratic structures, are not only in the EU’s interest but also in the interest of Western oil industries that would like to invest in the country and see their investments protected by the state. Third, Azerbaijan’s independence is only true in financial terms. The openness of the Azerbaijani government to technical support from the EU in order to improve the effectiveness of its administration proves that it is in need of technical know-how. Against this background, the EU should take a stronger stance on democratic developments, increase knowledge transfer and strengthen capacity-building measures at the administrative level.

This is a short version of an article by Dr. Katrin Böttger and Mariella Falkenhain, published by the Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin. To see the full version click here:

(http://iep-berlin.de/fileadmin/website/09_Publikationen/SPES_Policy_Papers/SPES_Policy_Paper_2011__The__EUs__policy__towards_Azerbaijan_BOETTGER_FALKENHAIN.pdf).