New context of the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership

Tweet

What is your assessment of recent developments in North Africa – the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya led by civil societies?

First, let me say something about society and civil society. It is often said that civil society has played a major role in revolts in those countries, but this mainly reflects a biased preconception on social movements. In my opinion, supported by my direct experience in Tunisia, where I was during the revolts in the second week of January, the revolts were not conducted by civil society in the sense of organised social or political movements, but by the society itself in an spontaneous reaction of rage and revolt, by the people, in particular the youth, who had been so far alien to civil society opposition groups. The same can be said for Egypt. Indeed, it is only in the aftermath of the regime changes that organised opposition took the lead of the transition process. 

Do you think that the regime changes in these states are a challenge, threat or opportunity for the European Union?

On the one hand, I think that they offer a clear opportunity to redefine the relations of the European Union with its neighbours and to overcome the major sources of instability in the Southern neighbourhood, coming not from the spectre of Islamism, but from the political stalemate in authoritarian regimes and from lack of economic prospects and living conditions which were unacceptable for the population.

Of course, this process entails major risks, but I would not qualify them as “threats” for the EU. The transition process can lead to a long period of instability and it might give rise to populist movements, very much as the combination of democracy and globalisation has given rise to populist movements in some Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia or Ecuador. And, of course, in the Arab countries the main populist movement could be the Islamists. Another risk is linked to the discredit of the EU, and hence western values, if it is not able to respond to the new context with a completely revamped approach. The wave of revolts and regime changes have called into question the whole EU policy in the region, focusing on promoting political, social and economic reforms in those countries without breaking the political and economic status quo. This approach was best synthesised in the Tunisian National Indicative Programme 2011-2013 approved by the European Commission in March 2010: “The choice of the Commission continues to be the commitment with the country in order to support the reforms in the perspective of a later progress in the filed of democracy, human rights and governance”.

This effective support for the authoritarian regimes in the region has been dramatically questioned by the societies in those countries themselves. The risk now is that the EU be not capable of reacting in a proper manner to this new context and to the new needs that come not from the authoritarian regimes now, but from societies wanting democratic but also economic transition in those countries. I can’t see so far either in the EU as a whole or in any of the Member States a capacity to react and to come forward with a new offer in a new framework for relations with these countries that could cope with those risks.

The ‘colour revolutions’ in Eastern Europe - in Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova - were not only protests against undemocratic regimes, but also protests for integration with the EU. Is the issue of cooperation with the EU important for the civil societies in North African states?

The situation in Arab Mediterranean countries is completely different for two reasons. First, in the case of Eastern Europe the collapse of the soviet system created a completely new environment, since those countries came from decades of no relation at all with the EU, and hence they had to define a framework from relations from the scratch. So everything was open at the time, the page was blank and societies could expect and hope for the EU to come forward with an accession offer. Indeed the prospect of full integration was a plausible possibility, as proved later by the integration of 10 Eastern European states.

In the case of the Southern Mediterranean countries, the situation is completely different, because there is a long record of intense relations between the EU and those countries. Already in 1976 the European Economic Community signed Trade and Cooperation Agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. Next, there was the Euro-Mediterranean Partnershipstarted in 1995and the European Neighbourhood Policy since 2005, as well as the Union for the Mediterranean and even the Advanced Status granted to Morocco in 2008. This process has actually left an impression in those societies, that Europe is pro status quo, and is not a factor for changes in those countries. Southern Mediterranean people have made the experience that Europe doesn’t want to come forward with real commitments in terms of resources, in terms of market access or mobility, let alone in terms of accession. Even in the case of Morocco, which was granted Advanced Status in 2008, there is a kind of disappointment, because they finally realised that the Advanced Status doesn’t mean anything new, beyond what was already on offer in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. So I don’t think that the prospects regarding the EU assistance have played any role in the revolts.

Do you think that the EU should change its current foreign policy toolbox? What role do you see for the European Neighbourhood Policy, and especially for the Mediterranean Union? What changes should the EU introduce to cope with the challenges presently coming from the developments in the North Africa region?

It is important to differentiate the bilateral and the multilateral track of the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
As far as bilateral relations are concerned, I don’t think that major changes are necessary in the current toolbox. What is necessary is a radical change in the way this toolbox is used. Why? As far as I see it, the European Neighbourhood Policy is inspired by the accession model and it includes all the array of the instruments and tools proper to the accession process, i.e. to accompany the process of political, economical, institutional and social transformation to converge towards the EU model. Whether this ultimately leads to accession or not is not so relevant; the question is to make sure that the right package of incentives is there: the ENP was based on the assumption and the promise that any country completing economic, political, institutional reforms in line of the acquis communautaire would actually be entitled to full participation in the European economic space, i.e. participation in EU common policies, benefit from the four freedoms (including mobility of persons and full market access).... Now, at least some of these elements originally included in the ENP model have been excluded altogether from the actual implementation of the ENP so far, diluting the EU offer to ENP partners. So the participation in two key policies has been fully excluded – the Common Agricultural Policy and the Regional Policy. In the case of Morocco, to give an example, there were talks and even the engagement by the EU to explore possibilities of participation in structural funds. This has eventually disappeared from official documents and any formal discussions.

If we turn to the liberalization of agricultural markets, in concrete terms, even for a country like Morocco where agriculture plays a major role, the concessions given by the EU are very weak. In the area of mobility, there is a complete blockade, and there is not even talk of visa facilitation, as it is the case for Eastern European neighbours, let alone free movement of persons. So what happens is that the packages of incentives has weakened substantially in the process of implementing the ENP, and Southern Mediterranean Partners are left with the legitimate impression that the EU is not offering anything substantial in exchange for the reforms and legislative convergence it requires from partners.  

If Europe really wants to support Mediterranean countries in their process of convergence with the EU, and I mean not only normative convergence but also real convergence, it should come back to the regional policy model it offered in the framework of the ENP. I’m not advocating for immediate access to structural funds, but rather a clear policy framework including a prospect of accessing structural funds if certain conditions are respected by those countries and reforms implemented. So I think that the toolbox as such is appropriate to accommodate a new level of bilateral relations with these countries; it is concrete implementation which has not been up to expectations and promises.

Regarding the multilateral level, we had the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership until 2008, which had some positive results mainly in the field of political dialogue, but very modest in terms of the social and economic transformation of those countries, and even less in terms of political reform. This was replaced by the Union for the Mediterranean, which was conceived mainly as a framework for promoting major regional projects in some specific fields. It is based to a large extent on an intergovernmental approach, which actually left the European Commission and the EU’s institutions as such with a marginal role in the whole process. It has ultimately been a complete failure. The calls by France, Spain and other four Mediterranean ministers, excepting Italia, in the letter published in the 16^th February to reactivate the Union for the Mediterranean is little more than an attempt to safe their face. I don’t think that it’s possible now to redress what has already gone wrong with the Union for the Mediterranean: a wrong concept of partnership, a completely inappropriate institutional design, a misplaced set of priorities.

So here a thorough review of the toolbox is indeed required. What is needed is rather: 1) to rescue and reinforce the elements of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which worked well, such as the regional programmes and the region-wide sectoral strategies (for instance in the fields of energy, transportation, women participation, employment, water management or culture), and 2) to find a way to bring back the multilateral track of the EU-Mediterranean relations under the umbrella of the EU’s institutions (i.e., to devolve the management of that process to the European Commission). And the way of doing this is in my opinion not to go forward with the Union for the Mediterranean as such, but to complement the bilateral track of the ENP in the Mediterranean as we know it with a strong multilateral track including regional programmes, sectoral strategies (this could be somehow equivalent to the thematic platforms of the Eastern Partnership) and regional projects as planned within the Union for the Mediterranean. A kind of ENPI-South regional programme. Another key element in the new framework is to make sure that the ENP is functional to the wider and deeper South-South economic integration in the Mediterranean.

In which areas should the EU develop its specific projects?

I think that this is the wrong question, and an evidence of how the Union for the Mediterranean has distorted the debate. Why? I think the Union for the Mediterranean was wrong from the very beginning precisely because it was focused on concrete projects. Maybe there were good projects, but it was a mistake to focus on them alone. What is needed is rather a comprehensive framework of relations between the EU and the Mediterranean countries including a blueprint for economic, political and social transition in these societies and the prospects for a gradual but full integration into the EU space if they follow suit. Then concrete programmes or projects can be designed to accompany this process.

In contrast, the EU risks to limit itself to a superficial review of the ENP implementation in the region after the events in the Mediterranean, reorienting the objectives and instruments of ENP towards democracy support and civil society programmes, but without a thorough redesign of the framework of relations implicit in the ENP. Now a transition is needed not only in the political regime and the economic model of Mediterranean partner countries, but also in the EU’s approach to them. The latter is also long overdue. But the reality is that so far the fundamental offer the EU is making to these countries has not changed substantially. 

Do you think that the European model is the only option for those countries? Could the other players in the region offer an alternative model?

The Maghreb countries - Algeria and even more Morocco and Tunisia - don’t have, in my opinion, a real alternative to the EU. More than 70% of their trade is with EU, they have a large population of emigrants in the EU, and so on and so forth. I don’t think that they have an alternative but there is a risk that they may come to conclusion that the EU is not being up to their demands and needs in this key period of their history – a true second independence, as it has been qualified- nor to its responsibility in this region, and the sense of frustration and resentment with the EU could rise in society.

In the case of the Mashreq countries – Egypt and others, such as Jordan for instance – there are certainly many other important actors which are very much present in their economies and societies. So there is a greater risk for the EU that they opt for alternative models of integration into the world economy. This is what is all about. Now, this disengagement from Europe in the near neighbourhood could undermine EU’s role as global actor. In any case, in my view the main question now is that if the EU doesn’t come forward with a comprehensive, attractive package of support and assistance to those countries, a clear path to integrate them into the European space, the scenario of a Mediterranean without Europe is going to be increasingly relevant. In some cases this would be the consequence of the more pro-active strategy of other external actors in the region, such as the Asiatic powers or the United States or others, but it will mainly result from the increasing dividing line across the Mediterranean and a loss of a strategic interest for those countries to engage with the EU due to the EU’s inability to come forward with a clear offer. These countries are natural partners for the EU; I can hardly see the EU as a global actor if it is not able to play a key role in the Southern Mediterranean region.

How would you comment on a letter sent by six EU Mediterranean Member States proposing to shift resources allocated by the EU from the east to the south? What could be the advantages and disadvantages if this were to happen?

The letter is accompanied by a ‘non-paper’. The non-paper has obviously been drafted by France and merely endorsed by the other countries. The letter underlines a very obvious trend observed in the last few years: EU aid for the Eastern European countries has increased faster than to the Southern Mediterranean countries. This trend was upheld by the approval of the ENP National Indicative Programmes by the European Commission in March 2010, where the average increase for the Eastern Partnership countries was 58%, whereas the average increase for the Southern neighbours was less than 30%. And this happened despite the opposition of three major EU Mediterranean countries, namely France, Italy and Spain, which were overruled by all the other member states in the Council. This is the context that we shouldn’t ignore.

The fact is that recent developments in the Southern Mediterranean countries and in Eastern Europe have completely changed the political context of EU fund allocations for the neighbouring countries. So far the working assumption by all stakeholders was that the most Mediterranean countries could aspire to in the new Financial Perspective 2014-2020 was to keep the current level of resources and that any increase would be flowing to the Eastern partners. This prospect has been reversed in the last few weeks. First, the elections in Belarus marked a clear backlash against the democratic process in that country. Also in Ukraine, the result of last elections was not very favourable for the pro-European forces. So, the prospects for reforms in the East have somehow deteriorated.

But what is more important is that in the Southern Mediterranean countries some democratic processes have emerged and this has mobilised the population not only in those countries, but also in Europe to support assistance to transition in those countries. We don’t know how this situation is going to be resolved but in my opinion the assumed trend has been reversed. Now it’s easier to think that assistance to the Southern Mediterranean countries is going to increase faster than the assistance to the Eastern Partnership countries, because of pressing demands.

In my view the situation should and could be used by the Eastern and Mediterranean EU’s countries to agree on a neutral framework for the distribution of assistance to the Eastern and the Southern partners depending only on the performance by each country in implementing reforms – as already originally foreseen in the ENP. It’s necessary to establish a clear framework of differentiation and modulated packages of assistance directly related to concrete reforms, and not to the strategic interest of Member States and the EU internal bargaining. This is of course not easy, but if we don’t manage now in the current situation, then I don’t see when this could be possible.

Do you think that competition between Member States – between those which are interested to increasing engagement in the South and in the East – could emerge?

The competition is already there, it has been explicit at least since June 1995, in the Cannes European Council, as France and Spain agreed with Germany the distribution of funds for the Eastern European partners and the Mediterranean partners. This led to the rule of directing 2/3 of all funds allocated to the neighbouring countries to Mediterranean countries and 1/3 to Eastern European neighbours (what in fact meant favouring the latter in per capita terms). This rule has been applied strictly until 2009, as the European Commission decided to allocate €300 million to the Eastern Partnership. The South-East competition was again very clear in the discussion on the National Indicative Programmes 2011-2013 approved by the European Commission in March 2010, as Mediterranean Member States failed in their opposition to the financial allocations approved, because they meant that per capita aid to Eastern Partnership countries during that period (€6 per inhabitant and per year on average) would for the first time overtake per capita aid to Mediterranean countries (€4.2 per inhabitant and per year on average).

But I think that the revolts in Arab countries have created the best possible conditions to reach and agreement on a framework for the distribution of resources for the 2014-2020 Financial Perspectives. The EU should take advantage of the current context to design a common assistance package to the Southern and the Eastern neighbours based on objective benchmarks of performance in political and economic reforms. This framework could offer to all partners a clear path for “more for more” (a bigger offer if they achieve concrete reforms) which is far from being the case now instead of a distribution of funds mainly based on the strategic bargaining between Member States within the EU.

And the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean? Where do they stand in this new context?

In the last three years, the major change in EU relations to the neighbours has concerned the development of the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. The Eastern Partnership was a reaction to the long-standing existence of a multilateral framework for relations with Southern Mediterranean partners (first the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership since 1995 and then the Union for the Mediterranean since 2008), something which was lacking in the East. So, the EaP was somehow inspired by the experience of the Southern Mediterranean. But over the last two years the EaP has achieved a remarkable progress and in some areas could become a model for multilateral relations in the Mediterranean. Now the EaP is effectively working as a multilateral track of the Eastern neighbourhood and the Union for the Mediterranean is completely lost as a multilateral track for the Southern Mediterranean countries. So it does make sense to try to replicate some elements of the experience of the Eastern Partnership - which is managed by the European Commission and very clearly framed within the EU decision making process - in the Southern Mediterranean.

Interview made on 22/02/2011